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In this article, I argue that the historical context of the Alaska 
Constitutional Convention should open up the Alaska Constitu-
tion to independent interpretation.  Alaska courts sometimes 
avoid independent interpretation of the Alaska Constitution be-
cause it seems to be based on borrowed federal constitutional law.  
This apparent borrowing may be discounted by understanding the 
historical situation of the Alaska statehood movement and the 
power of Congress to mold state constitutions.  Because of the in-
herent ambiguity of state constitutional provisions that have fed-
eral analogues, Alaska courts should abandon lockstep interpreta-
tion of these provisions and instead independently interpret them 
in line with the Alaska constitutional heritage.  This would further 
protect the rights of Alaskans and make important contributions 
to the nation's shared constitutional discourse. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Originalism1 has today become so dominant a strategy for  
understanding law that it sometimes seems we are all originalists.2  
Originalists claim that reference to historical sources provides an 
objective method of making legal decisions, based on either endur-
ing values3 or the meaning of words in context.4  According to 
originalists, original meaning is determinant of constitutional law.5  
In seeking to interpret the United States Constitution, legal schol-
ars use originalism to understand a truly original work—the first 
written national constitution.6 
Despite its attractiveness as a method for interpreting the 
United States Constitution, originalism is much more intellectually 
frustrating when used to interpret decidedly unoriginal constitu-
tions—constitutions whose provisions are largely derived from 
other documents and framed by polities reliant on the U.S. Con-
gress for sovereignty.  Originalism’s main strength—recovering the 
historical context of constitutional provisions to determine consti-
tutional law—is substantially weakened when it is used to examine 
an unoriginal constitution because state constitutional history, as 
opposed to national constitutional history, is inherently indetermi-
nant of constitutional meaning.  This inherent “indeterminancy” 
arises from the unoriginal nature of state constitutions. 
 
 1. Defined as “the theory that the Federal Constitution should be interpreted 
according to the intent of those who drafted and adopted it.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1133 (8th ed. 1999). 
 2. Lawrence H. Tribe, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 67 (1997).  Alaska courts often use originalist 
methodology.  See, e.g., Duncan v. Retired Pub. Employees of Alaska, Inc., 71 
P.3d 882, 887 (Alaska 2003); Hootch v. Alaska State-Operated Sch. Sys., 536 P.2d 
793, 800 (Alaska 1975); State v. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d 920, 928 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1992). But see Warwick v. Chance, 548 P.2d 384, 391 (Alaska 1976) (“[W]e do not 
construe [our constitution] to be a static document.  Like its federal counterpt., it 
must be considered as a living document adaptable to changing conditions and cir-
cumstances unanticipated at the time it was written.”). 
 3. Tribe, supra note 2, at 81. 
 4. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 2, at 3, 16. 
 5. See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 3–22 (1996) (discussing 
the various uses of “original intent,” “original meaning,” and “original under-
standing”). 
 6. Id. 
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Yet, a corollary strength—describing the nature of ambiguity 
in local constitutional history—is augmented.  Understanding this 
ambiguity enables a court to discount plausible “determinant 
originalist” arguments that would ask a court to interpret a state 
constitution in accordance with the documents on which it may 
have been modeled.  Understanding the indeterminant nature of 
state constitutional history also encourages courts to interpret state 
constitutions according to local constitutional heritage.  This is the 
strength and virtue of “indeterminant originalism.” Perhaps no-
where is the opportunity for indeterminant originalism greater than 
in Alaska, the last state to adopt its founding constitution. 
Recently, the University of Alaska has begun to make histori-
cal material easily available on the Internet in celebration of the fif-
tieth anniversary of the Alaska Constitution.7  Thus, Alaska courts 
considering constitutional questions will undoubtedly be inundated 
with historical evidence marshaled in a determinant originalist mo-
dality.  This evidence must be viewed in the larger context of the 
statehood movement to see how the Alaska constitution protects 
Alaskans’ rights more broadly than does the Federal Constitution.8  
This is not just good sense, it is good law: the Alaska Supreme 
Court decides the meaning of the Alaska Constitution without hav-
ing to look to federal interpretation of the Federal Constitution.  
This is “independent interpretation.”9 
Because the Federal Constitution provides a sturdy floor for 
civil rights, the Alaska Supreme Court’s independent interpreta-
tion of the Alaska Constitution based on Alaska’s local constitu-
tional heritage can serve to safeguard rights beyond federal consti-
 
 7. “Creating Alaska—The Origins of the 49th State” will collect historic ma-
terials regarding the statehood movement and the Alaska Constitutional Conven-
tion and archive statehood materials currently in Alaska museums and libraries.  
See UNIVERSITY OF ALASKA, CREATING ALASKA—THE ORIGINS OF THE 49TH 
STATE, http://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). 
 8. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401–02 (Alaska 1970) (extending 
the right to a jury trial under the Alaska Constitution to violations of city ordi-
nances even though no such right had been recognized under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution). 
 9. Id.  For a critique of “independent interpretation,” see Earl M. Maltz, The 
Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995 (1985).  The Alaska consti-
tution provides many “rights” that go beyond those found in the Federal Constitu-
tion.  E.g., Valley Hosp. Ass’n v. Mat-Su Coalition for Choice, 948 P.2d 963, 968 
(Alaska 1997) (right to reproductive privacy); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 
(Alaska 1975) (right to privacy in the home); McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91 
(Alaska 1974) (right of self-representation in a post-conviction hearing); Breese v. 
Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972) (right to wear hairstyles reflecting personal 
choice in public schools). 
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tutional protections.10  In this article, I argue that Alaska state 
courts can find new state constitutional rights even in state consti-
tutional provisions that are superficially or even substantially 
analogous to the provisions of constitutions on which the Alaska 
constitution is modeled.  This is due to the drive for statehood in 
Alaska, which created such intense pressure to conform the Alaska 
constitution to “outside” models, such that its text might not always 
be the best indicator of its heritage.  Specific, recoverable historical 
context can serve to discount analogies between Alaska and federal 
constitutional law, opening the door for the Alaska Supreme Court 
to recognize new and expanded civil rights as part of Alaska’s con-
stitutional heritage. 
In Part II of this article, I discuss the role of independent in-
terpretation and originalism at the state level generally and in 
Alaska particularly.  In Part III(A), I briefly discuss the history of 
the Alaska constitutional convention before arguing in Part III(B) 
that substantial pressures from both the Alaska citizenry and the 
United States Congress might have masked portions of the Alaska 
constitutional heritage in the framing of the Alaska Constitution.  
In Part IV, I conclude that Alaska’s ambiguous constitutional his-
tory should not be ignored by Alaska courts, but should rather be 
embraced in order to recognize additional constitutional rights, fol-
lowing the guide of Baker v. City of Fairbanks. 
II.  INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS 
Since Justice Brennan’s call to state judges to interpret their 
state constitutions before considering the Federal Constitution,11 
judicial recognitions of rights under many states’ constitutions have 
bloomed.  Even in the first decade after Brennan’s invitation, 
scholars noted the development of new rights in several states  
through this process of independent interpretation, including Ore- 
 
 10. See Doe v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 92 P.3d 398, 404 (Alaska 2004) (“We may 
not undermine the minimum protections established by the United States Su-
preme Court’s interpretations of the Federal Constitution.”);  see also GERALD A. 
MCBEATH, THE ALASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 25 (1997) 
(suggesting that the United States Constitution “establishes a floor of protection 
for individual rights”). 
 11. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490-91, 495–98, 501–04 (1977). 
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gon,12 California,13 Texas,14 and Maine.15  Each of these states has 
developed a jurisprudence identifying additional constitutional 
protections beyond those in the federal document.  For example, 
indigent defendants in Maine accused of certain misdemeanors 
gained the right to court-appointed counsel even though the Fed-
eral Constitution extends that right only to accused felons.16  Two 
recent articles have discussed the phenomenon of independent in-
terpretation in Alaska.17 
Independent interpretation of state constitutions has become 
an important part of the recognition of new constitutional rights 
and has helped transform state supreme courts into the keepers of 
the nation’s conscience.18  Judges in states with robust individual-
rights jurisprudences are particularly concerned that their decisions 
will be overturned if based on the Federal Constitution, and so as a 
 
 12. See generally John H. Buttler, Oregon’s Constitutional Renaissance: Feder-
alism Revisited, 13 VT. L. REV. 107 (1988) (surveying Oregon’s expanded free-
doms of religion and expression, rights of criminal defendants, and privileges and 
immunities); see also David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism, 
91 MICH. L. REV. 274, 276 (1992) (“A state—even an out-of-the-way and relatively 
new one like Oregon—can develop a strikingly independent universe of constitu-
tional references and a constitutional culture completely distinct from the one 
used by the U.S. Supreme Court.”). 
 13. See, e.g., Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conser-
vative, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1089–90 (1985) (discussing right to free speech in 
shopping malls). 
 14. See generally James C. Harrington, Privacy and the Texas Constitution, 13 
VT. L. REV. 155 (1988) (discussing right to privacy). 
 15. See, e.g., Marshall J. Tinkle, State Constitutional Law in Maine: At the 
Crossroads, 13 VT. L. REV. 61, 80 (1988) (discussing the right to counsel for defen-
dants accused of misdemeanors in addition to those accused of felonies). 
 16. Id.  In another example, the California Supreme Court read California’s 
free-speech provision more expansively than the First Amendment, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed.  Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 
1974), aff’d 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
 17. See Thomas V. Van Flein, The Baker Doctrine and the New Federalism: 
Developing Independent Constitutional Principles Under the Alaska Constitution, 
21 ALASKA L. REV. 227 (2004); Ronald L. Nelson, Welcome to the “Last Frontier,” 
Professor Gardner: Alaska’s Independent Approach to State Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 12 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1995).  Additional authors have discussed par-
ticular rights in Alaska in depth.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Privacy and the 
Alaska Constitution: Failing to Fulfill the Promise, 20 ALASKA L. REV. 29 (2003); 
Steven Keith Green, Freedom of Religion in Alaska: Interpreting the Alaska Con-
stitution, 5 ALASKA L. REV. 237 (1988); Michael B. Wise, Northern Lights—Equal 
Protection Analysis in Alaska, 3 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1986). 
 18. Paul Finkleman & Stephen E. Gottlieb, Introduction, in TOWARDS A 
USABLE PAST 1, 13 (Paul Finkleman & Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991). 
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result sometimes base their decisions solely on the state constitu-
tion.19  It is a controversial question whether state courts are finding 
new rights that reflect a state constitutional heritage or advancing 
civil rights the Supreme Court is unwilling to match on a national 
scale.20 Regardless of the answer, state courts are recognizing new 
rights, and these holdings will likely affect constitutional interpreta-
tion in other states.21  Through such decisions, states may regain 
their stature as the “informers” of the United States Constitution.22 
In Alaska, courts often apply independent interpretation in 
deciding cases.  Even where the Federal and Alaska Constitutions 
use identical language, the Alaska Supreme Court has held that the 
Alaska Constitution affords greater protections than the Federal 
Constitution.23  In 1995, Ronald Nelson first argued that Alaska’s 
independent interpretations are both uniquely local and nationally 
valuable, and described Alaska’s independent interpretation of 
clauses regarding equal protection, privacy, freedom of religion, 
and natural resources.24  Recently, Thomas Van Flein discussed a 
series of notable cases exemplifying independent interpretation 
and argued that such interpretation is obligatory under Baker.25  
 
 19. See Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court 
Comment on Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Con-
stitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (1985). 
 20. See Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont 
Law Review Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. 
REV. 13, 34–35 (1988) (referring to these perspectives as the “independent state 
jurisprudence” and “expansionist” views, respectively).  In addition to the ideo-
logical background of the Justices, there are institutional reasons why the U.S. Su-
preme Court may be unwilling to advance civil rights, including general concerns 
about federalism, trepidation about setting too high of a national standard, and 
jurisprudential restraints.  Utter, supra note 19, at 1043–45. 
 21. Judith S. Kaye, Contributions of State Constitutional Law to the Third Cen-
tury of American Federalism, 13 VT. L. REV. 49, 56 (1988);  see also McCray v. 
New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963 (1983) (Stevens, Blackmun, and Powell, JJ., concur-
ring). 
 22. Kermit Hall, Mostly Anchor and Little Sail: The Evolution of American 
State Constitutions, in TOWARDS A USABLE PAST 388, 391 (Paul Finkleman & 
Stephen E. Gottlieb eds., 1991); Utter, supra note 19, at 1040. 
 23. Van Flein, supra note 17, at 228; see, e.g., State v. Anthony 810 P.2d 155, 
157 (Alaska 1991); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11–12 (Alaska 1978). 
 24. Nelson, supra note 17, at 11–32. 
 25. Van Flein, supra note 17, at 244–56 (observing that “[w]e are free . . . to 
develop additional constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska Constitu-
tion if we find such fundamental rights and privileges to be within the intention 
and spirit of our local constitutional language and to be necessary for the kind of 
civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional heri-
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Both Nelson and Van Flein suggest that Alaska’s independent in-
terpretations are robust—not only on textual dissimilarity, but also 
on Alaska’s local constitutional heritage.26 
Yet in cases advancing independent interpretations of the 
Alaska Constitution, courts rarely explicitly rely on an originalist 
interpretation.27  This is unusual among state courts, which often 
seem to ease their trepidation at departing from federal interpreta-
tions by resorting to determinant originalism.28  Perhaps Alaska 
courts believe that originalism will force them into lockstep with 
the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal 
Constitution.  After all, the Alaska Court of Appeals already pre-
sumes that the Alaska Constitution should be interpreted in lock-
step with the Federal Constitution, even as federal constitutional 
doctrine changes.29  Whatever the reason, Alaska courts’ indiffer-
ence to originalism is unfortunate.  To the extent that Alaska’s 
unique history informs the provisions framed in Fairbanks in 1956, 
it can serve as a taproot for new or expanded constitutional rights.  
Additionally, an originalist understanding of the Alaska Constitu-
tion actually counsels against interpreting it in step with the Fed-
eral Constitution despite the appearance of the wholesale accep-
 
tage.”); see also State v. Browder, 486 P.2d 925 (Alaska 1971); Roberts v. State, 
458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969); MCBEATH, supra note 10, at 25. 
 26. See Van Flein, supra note 17, at 248 (discussing Swanner v. Anchorage 
Equal Rights Comm’n, 874 P.2d 274, 280–81 (Alaska 1994)), 254 (discussing Sta-
nek v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 81 P.3d 268, 272 (Alaska 2003));  see also Nelson, 
supra note 17, at 17 (recognizing positive aspects of Alaska’s broader interpreta-
tion of equal protection and the right to privacy). 
 27. Among the cases emphasized by Van Flein in his discussion of the Baker 
doctrine, only one case concerning provisions in Alaska’s constitution, Gonzalez, 
even touched on historical reasons for Alaska’s interpretation.  See Van Flein, su-
pra note 17, at 247–53 (discussing State v. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d 920 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1992) (using historical analysis)).  Alaska’s constitutional history plays a 
prominent role in Gonzalez, serving to link Alaska’s independent interpretation 
to both Oregon and Hawaii’s independent interpretations and to distance 
Alaska’s constitutional protections from a narrowing federal view.  See Gonzalez, 
825 P.2d at 933 (citing Frederic E. Brown, The Sources of the Alaska and Oregon 
Codes, Pt. I, 2 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 15 (1972) and Frederic E. Brown, The 
Sources of the Alaska and Oregon Codes, Pt. II, 2 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 87 
(1972)). 
 28. See G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpre-
tation, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 841, 855 (1991). 
 29. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 818 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).  
This is true even when the clause in question has already been interpreted differ-
ently from its federal counterpt.. Davis v. Municipality of Anchorage, 945 P.2d 
307, 311 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997). 
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tance of federal constitutional law at the Alaska Constitutional 
Convention.30  Such an appearance of wholesale acceptance may be 
explained by history and may be discounted by constitutional the-
ory; it does not necessarily solely reflect the Alaska constitutional 
heritage.  An indeterminant originalist understanding of the Alaska 
Constitution favors independent interpretation. 
The Alaska Supreme Court might also eschew originalism be-
cause originalism’s theoretical difficulties are daunting.  Recent 
state constitutions pose a major challenge to determinant original-
ism because they are “unoriginal” in two distinct ways: (1) they are 
in no way pre-political, but are part of an iterative process between 
politics and law; and (2) they are not crafted solely out of framers’ 
creativity but rather arise from multiple sources—they are derived 
from earlier versions, created by newly western Americans from 
pre-existing states, modeled on the consensus of experts, and 
forged under substantial and systemic congressional pressure to 
conform.31  Because state constitutions are iterative, derivative, and 
assimilative,32 they seemingly leave little room for the distinct ex-
pression of a state’s local constitutional heritage.33  In fact, it is pre-
cisely where a state has a strong local constitutional heritage dis-
tinct from the nation’s that Congress acts to suppress that heritage 
in the new state constitution.34 
 
 30. See, e.g., State v. Dankworth, 672 P.2d 148, 150–51 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983). 
 31. Under Gardner’s recently developed framework, state constitutions are 
neither unique, determinate, or self-constructed; thus, they cannot be understood 
in the constitutional positivist manner in which judges normally understand the 
Federal Constitution.  See James A. Gardner, Whose Constitution is it?  Why Fed-
eralism and Constitutional Positivism Don’t Mix, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 
1251 (2005). 
 32. Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Condi-
tions Imposed on States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 132 
(2004). 
 33. See George P. Fletcher, Constitutional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 737, 
737 (1993) (“When constitutional language fails to offer an unequivocal directive 
for decision, the recourse of the judge is not always to look ‘outward’ toward 
overarching principles of political morality. . . . The way to understand this sub-
category of decisions is to interpret them as expressions of the decision makers’ 
constitutional identities.”); see also ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 
42 (1995) (suggesting an appeal to the “national ethos” as an overarching method 
of interpretation).  In this article, I use “constitutional heritage” because that is 
the term used by the Alaska Supreme Court in Baker.  Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 
471 P.2d 386, 401–02 (Alaska 1970). 
 34. Biber, supra note 32, at 132–73 (discussing assimilative congressional re-
quirements for Louisiana, Utah, New Mexico, and Hawaii). 
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An additional theoretical complication arises from the knowl-
edge of the framers of recent state constitutions that the record of 
state constitutional conventions would likely be used to interpret 
the state constitution in the future.  Although courts have long 
used legislative history to understand statutes and constitutional 
provisions, it was particularly important in the 1940s and 1950s; 
consequently, as the most recent founding state constitutions were 
being framed, delegates knew the importance of history when they 
undertook their tasks.35  Sometimes, this knowledge was explicit.  
For example, the use of the “Tennessee Plan”36 to achieve state-
hood informs the Alaska Constitution, not simply because the Ten-
nessee Plan was part of the historical context, but because dele-
gates understood that it would have an impact.37  Because of the 
self-awareness of the delegates, judges cannot know for certain 
whether interested delegates manipulated the convention’s histori-
cal record.38   
 
 35. See Tarr, supra note 28, at 852. 
 36. The Tennessee Plan called for election of a congressional delegation be-
fore attaining statehood so the delegates could be sent to Washington, D.C. to 
campaign for statehood.  See infra pt. III.A. 
 37. On January 23, 1956, George Lehleitner addressed the Alaska 
Constitutional Convention: “[S]hould you Alaskans decide to use the Tennessee 
Plan and obtain statehood . . . [the] ordinance that you enact for that purpose, will 
bear . . . a significant relationship to the constitution in the sense that the 
Declaration [of Independence] bears a very definite relationship to the Federal 
Constitution.”  George Lehleitner, Private Citizen of New Orleans, Louisiana, 
Address at the Alaska Constitutional Convention (Jan. 23, 1956), 
http://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/convention/speeches/lehleitner.xml 
[hereinafter Lehleitner Address].  Lehleitner was a proponent of statehood for 
Alaska and Hawaii because he believed that an amalgamation of democracies 
around the world would prevent the rise of fascism and communism.  Lehleitner 
suggested that Alaska use the Tennessee Plan to achieve statehood.  See CLAUS-
M. NASKE, JOHN S. WHITEHEAD & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, ALASKA STATEHOOD: 
THE MEMORY OF THE BATTLE AND THE EVALUATION OF THE PRESENT BY THOSE 
WHO LIVED IT 100–02 (1981) [hereinafter ORAL HISTORY] (interview with George 
Lehleitner).  While it may be true that the Tennessee Plan had no effect on the 
terms of the Alaska Constitution, its influence is critical to understanding the 
Alaska Constitution as an organic document outlining a new political sovereign, 
and the framers of the Alaska Constitution understood that fact. 
 38. Cf. Scalia, supra note 4, at 29–37. 
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Alaska’s constitution is likewise unoriginal39—its origins are 
not unambiguously Alaskan; thus, determinant originalists encoun-
ter theoretical difficulty uncovering the values Alaskans expressed 
when framing and ratifying their state constitution.40  Sometimes, 
the values may seem obvious, such as when the words of the 
Alaska Constitution mimic the words of its models.  But it is pre-
cisely where the words are similar that judges might commit a fun-
damental attribution error by failing to account for the power of 
the historical situation in framing the state constitution.41  The his-
torical context of the Alaska Constitutional Convention offers al-
ternative explanations for some provisions, suggests they might not 
necessarily reflect the Alaska constitutional heritage, and encour-
ages courts to look elsewhere to find it.42 
III.  A MODEL AND MODELED CONSTITUTION 
A. The Last First Constitution: A Brief History43 
Alaska’s constitution was drafted in the winter of 1955-56, the 
last of a string of post-World War II state constitutions including 
those of Hawaii, Missouri, and New Jersey.44  The war brought vast 
 
 39. I do not use this term in a pejorative sense—Alaska does have a model 
constitution—but rather to say that Alaska’s constitution did not originate from 
the Alaskan pre-political heritage and came instead from an academic consensus 
reflecting the preferences of the Lower 48 states. 
 40. See Fletcher, supra note 33, at 737 (opining that constitutional interpreta-
tion in close cases should depend on “constitutional identities”). 
 41. For a discussion of attribution theory, see Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psy-
chologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process, in 10 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173 (L. Berkowitz ed., 1977). 
 42. “[I]f one is to remain faithful to the original understanding of state consti-
tutions, one must look . . . to the broader political and theoretical context from 
which the state provisions came.”  Tarr, supra note 28, at 858.  Yet, while a contex-
tual understanding of the pressures on delegates calls into doubt the “Alaskan na-
ture” of constitutional provisions superficially similar to those of its models, such 
an understanding also demonstrates the full resilience of Alaska’s local constitu-
tional heritage where the text of Alaska’s constitution dept.s from its models.  
These dept.ures indicate a strong, independent constitutional heritage for Alaska 
while not denying the possibility of a strong, independent constitutional heritage 
where delegates adopted provisions suggested by Outsiders.  Unfortunately, this 
side of the argument is beyond the scope of this article. 
 43. Alaska’s constitutional convention is discussed most fully by delegate Vic-
tor Fischer.  See generally VICTOR FISCHER, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (1975). 
 44. Another useful source on the drafting is the “Creating Alaska” project.  
See CREATING ALASKA—THE ORIGINS OF THE 49TH STATE, supra note 7. 
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military support to Alaska, giving it the population and economy to 
credibly demand statehood.45  To help satisfy the burgeoning de-
mand for statehood, Alaska adopted its constitution prior to be-
coming a state46 and sent a full slate of elected delegates to con-
vince the U.S. Congress of the merits of Alaska statehood.47 
In planning the constitutional convention, the Alaska State-
hood Committee asked outside experts to analyze the function of 
state constitutions within the federal system and to recommend 
provisions desirable for Alaska.48  Consultants were present at the 
convention but “managed to stay out of the public eye, avoiding 
the criticism that ‘outsiders’ were writing the constitution.”49  Yet, 
they still had a strong influence.50 
In addition to seeking consultants’ advice, delegates looked for 
guidance from the National Municipal League’s model constitution 
and the constitutions of other states and countries.51  According to 
one delegate’s account, the model constitution “provided delegates 
with a composite view of what was then considered . . . the most 
advanced thinking with respect to constitutional concepts and pro-
visions.”52  However, this model was designed for states seeking to 
tweak their constitutions and not for territories attempting to cre-
ate them.53  Alaska, not yet a state and with no prior constitution, 
had greater freedom for innovation than states with existing consti-
tutions.54 
B. Pressures on the Constitutional Convention 
Despite the unfettered innovation attributed to the Alaska 
Constitutional Convention, the Alaska Constitution is remarkable 
for its unoriginality.  For the most part, Alaska’s constitution is bor-
 
 45. JOHN WHITEHEAD, COMPLETING THE UNION: ALASKA AND HAWAII AND 
THE BATTLE FOR STATEHOOD 7 (2004).  By 1956, many prominent Alaskans had 
been pushing hard for statehood for over forty years.  CLAUS-M. NASKE & 
HERMAN E. SLOTNICK, ALASKA: A HISTORY OF THE 49TH STATE 141–42 (2d ed. 
1987). 
 46. Lehleitner Address, supra note 37. 
 47. NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 45, at 155. 
 48. Id. at 19–20. 
 49. Id. at 42. 
 50. Id. at 49. 
 51. Id. at 49, 51, 113. 
 52. Id. at 50. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
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rowed law.55  Its judicial selection provisions were modeled on Mis-
souri’s.56  The finance and taxation article was modeled on the con-
stitutions proposed by Hawaii and the National Municipal League, 
adjusted for a statehood bill pending in Congress.57  Despite being 
framed nearly 170 years after the Federal Constitution, Alaska’s 
constitution includes nearly verbatim versions of some rather dusty 
federal provisions.58  According to many experts, Alaska produced 
a model constitution.59 Because the Framers of 1956 made deliber-
ate and judicious choices, those assessments are accurate.  But, 
Alaska’s constitution is “model” because it itself is based on so 
many models. 
Apart from simply wanting a good framework of government, 
the major reason for the fidelity of the Alaska Constitution to out-
side models was the overwhelming desire for statehood.  According 
to Alaska political scientists Gerald McBeath and Thomas More-
house, “[the delegates’] first objective was to obtain statehood; af-
ter that they could turn their attention to the uses of statehood 
powers.”60  The statehood objective required the adoption of the 
Tennessee Plan of electing a congressional delegation before actu-
ally becoming a state.  This objective affected both the timing of 
the constitution’s framing and its very terms—to match the confi-
dence evinced by the Tennessee Plan, Alaska needed an ideal con-
stitution to prove it was mature enough for statehood.61  To create 
such a model, Alaskans mimicked other states, looked to outside 
experts, and preemptively capitulated to Congress’s probable de-
 
 55. For a definition of “borrowed law,” see generally ALAN WATSON, ANCIENT 
LAW AND MODERN UNDERSTANDING: AT THE EDGES 4 (1998) (“The life of the 
law is not logic, nor is it experience.  It is borrowing.”). 
 56. FISCHER, supra note 43, at 113.  Compare ALASKA CONST. art. IV with 
MO. CONST. art. V. 
 57. FISCHER, supra note 43, at 142. 
 58. Id. at 70.  Compare ALASKA CONST, art. I, § 20 (“No member of the armed 
forces shall in time of peace be quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner . . . .”) with U.S. CONST. amend. III. (“No Soldier shall, in time of peace be 
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner . . . .”). 
 59. NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 45, at 155. 
 60. GERALD A. MCBEATH & THOMAS A. MOREHOUSE, ALASKA POLITICS 
AND GOVERNMENT 120 (1994); see also GERALD E. BOWKETT, REACHING FOR A 
STAR: THE FINAL CAMPAIGN FOR ALASKA STATEHOOD xi, 8 (1989). 
 61. According to George Rogers, a consultant to the convention, “delegates 
did not attempt to be too innovative in their constitution writing for fear that the 
U.S. Congress might not accept too innovative a document.”  MCBEATH & 
MOREHOUSE, supra note 60, at 126 (interview with George Rogers).  But see 
WHITEHEAD, supra note 45, at 255 (characterizing the Tennessee Plan as “clever 
or unseemly or not quite cricket,” but not excessively audacious). 
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mands.  This historical context suggests that the Alaska Constitu-
tion might not be fully representative of Alaska’s local constitu-
tional heritage.62  That is, the “constitutional identity”63 of Alaskans 
is not infused into the state constitution in the same way that the 
framers of Pennsylvania’s radical constitution were seized by the 
“spirit of ‘76” or the United States Constitution was infused with 
the “originality of ‘87.” 
1. The Popular Drive for Statehood.  Alaskans in the 1950s 
wanted statehood.  The issue had been hotly debated since 1924.64 
By 1946, most Alaskans favored statehood to accelerate economic 
development and shake off federal control over fish traps,65 which 
was viewed as responsible for the precipitous decline in fish 
stocks.66  By 1958, when Alaskans formally accepted statehood in a 
plebiscite vote, more than 80% of voters chose statehood.67 
The drive for statehood was not merely about correcting fed-
eral mismanagement of natural resources.  A moral argument for 
self-determination and the global rebuking of colonial power dur-
 
 62. Certainly, delegates had a great deal of choice in framing the constitution.  
The reasons behind the deliberate choices of delegates between adopting provi-
sions of the Hawaii, Missouri, or New Jersey Constitutions, or the academic in-
sights of the National Municipal League, the Kestenbaum Commission, or other 
consultants, are important for determining original meaning.  But the choice be-
tween several possible models, although grist for the originalist mill, does not alter 
the goals of the convention—to prove to Congress Alaska’s merit for statehood, 
not simply to crystallize the constitutional heritage of Alaska. 
 63. Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional 
Law, 84 VA. L. REV. 389, 389–92 (1998). 
 64. NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 45, at 141–43.  The idea of petitioning the 
territory was still alive in the 1950s.  According to one authority, business leaders 
in Nome “suggested that Alaska be divided along the 153 meridian into a state 
and district, and that the latter be allowed to join the former when it had devel-
oped economically and no longer would be a liability to the new state.”  Id. at 184.  
In 1954, Territorial Governor B. Frank Heintzleman suggested petitioning Alaska 
to make southeast, south-central, and interior Alaska into a state.  BOWKETT, su-
pra note 60, at 17. 
 65. STEPHEN HAYCOX, ALASKA: AN AMERICAN COLONY 268–69 (2002); see 
also William A. Egan, Remarks to the Alaska Constitutional Convention (Feb. 5, 
1956), http://www.alaska.edu/creatingalaska/convention/speeches/egan.xml [here-
inafter Egan Remarks]. 
 66. See FISCHER, supra note 43, at 8; Egan Remarks, supra note 65; ORAL 
HISTORY, supra note 37, at 2; see also WHITEHEAD, supra note 45, at 35, 46, 210–
16.  The federal government asserted control over fishing and mining at the behest 
of Outside interests.  MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 60, at 42, 78. 
 67. ORAL HISTORY, supra note 37, at 367. 
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ing and after World War II also contributed.68  To attain their goal, 
Alaskans stretched the rhetoric of self-determination, anti-
colonialism, and anti-communism; Ernst Gruening’s keynote ad-
dress at the constitutional convention provides such an example: 
“Inherent in colonialism is an inferior political status.  Inherent in 
colonialism is an inferior economic status. . . . The economic disad-
vantages of Alaskans . . . are the hallmarks of colonialism.”69  Gru-
ening evinced anti-Soviet sentiment as well: “It is an inspiring chal-
lenge to us to establish on this side of the Bering Strait . . . a shining 
example of our way of life, of government by consent of the gov-
erned.”70  In short, the desire for statehood was influenced by both 
the circumstances and the times. 
2. Congressional Reluctance and Requirements for Alaska 
Statehood.  To acquire statehood, Alaska needed to secure Con-
gress’s consent.71  Generally, a congressional enabling act author-
izes a territory to hold a constitutional convention, and a congres-
sional admission act formally admits a new state.72  Before 
admission, Congress reviews the proposed state constitution and 
may require changes.73  Congress set a high bar for Alaska’s entry 
into the Union—lawmakers were worried about diluting their indi-
vidual power and were concerned that the Alaska congressional 
delegation would not make easy allies.  Congress’s reluctance to 
grant statehood to Alaska pressured Alaska statehood proponents 
to anticipate the will of Congress and frame constitutional provi-
sions accordingly. 
Members of Congress are generally reluctant to admit new 
states because it costs each current lawmaker power.74  New states 
 
 68. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Tower, Anthony J. Dimond: Statehood Pioneer, 13 
ALASKA HIST. 29, 45–47 (1998). 
 69. Ernst Gruening, Address to the Alaska Constitutional Convention: Let Us 
Now End American Colonialism (Nov. 9, 1955), http://www.alaska.edu/ 
creatinglaska/convention/speeches/gruening.xml [hereinafter Gruening Address].  
Gruening’s speech at the convention is littered with dramatic rhetoric comparing 
the federal government to King George III and compiling grievances against the 
federal government in much the same manner as Jefferson did against King 
George III in the Declaration of Independence.  Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. 
 72. Biber, supra note 32, at 127–28. 
 73. Id. at 128. 
 74. Lehleitner Address, supra note 37; NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 45, at 
212.  This threat was apparently so great that opponents of Alaska statehood sug-
gested amending the U.S. Constitution to reduce the amount of representation in 
any new state.  Id. 
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will bring new delegates to Congress, forcing reapportionment in 
the House of Representatives.75  This concern may seem small 
given the three-member size of Alaska’s delegation, but lawmakers 
in the 1950s assumed that Hawaii would enter the Union simulta-
neously.76  With the addition of four new Senators, the two-thirds 
supermajority needed to invoke cloture, override a veto, or consent 
to a treaty would increase from 65 to 67 votes.77 
The dilution of power may be worthwhile to Representatives 
or Senators if new congressional delegates can be counted on as al-
lies; however, despite Alaska’s apparent similarity to other western 
states, its geographic remoteness and special environmental con-
cerns presented obstacles to alliance-building.78  Some lawmakers 
opposed statehood because of political pressure from large compa-
nies whose Alaska investments would be at risk under a new state 
tax system.79  For others, cloture was of particular importance.80  
These lawmakers opposed statehood out of fear that Alaska would 
support controversial equal rights legislation.81 
 
 75. BOWKETT, supra note 60, at 19.  No matter how small the population, 
every state in the union must have at least one representative.  U.S. CONST. art. I., 
§ 2.  Even seats in the Senate, where representation is not based on population, 
are diluted by the addition of states, because the Senate can consent to treaties, 
override a veto, or invoke cloture on debate only if a certain portion of Senators 
agree.  See Lehleitner Address, supra note 37. 
 76. FISCHER, supra note 43, at 9; Lehleitner Address, supra note 37. 
 77. See NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 45, at 165.  The Senate did not adopt 
the three-fifths rule until 1975.  See United States Senate Art and History, 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhitory/history/common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture. 
htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2005). 
 78. See GOING UP IN FLAMES: THE PROMISES AND PLEDGES OF ALASKA 
STATEHOOD UNDER ATTACK 13 (Malcolm B. Roberts ed., 1990). 
 79. The Seattle Chamber of Commerce never endorsed Alaska statehood, 
even after every other Pacific Coast Chamber had.  See ERNST GRUENING, 
BATTLE FOR ALASKA STATEHOOD 99 (1967).  Gruening believed that the Cham-
ber’s reluctance was due to the fact that its Alaska Committee was “dominated by 
a handful of men who view Alaska as King George III and his ministers viewed 
the thirteen colonies—as something to be exploited and kept down but never to 
be given equality.”  Id. 
 80. MCBEATH, supra note 10, at 5; MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 60, 
at 47.  At the 1949 Governors Conference, Georgia Gov. Herman Talmadge vo-
cally opposed a resolution calling for the admission of Alaska: “‘The people I rep-
resent are opposed to the admission of any states whose Senators are not likely to 
take our position on cloture.’”  See GRUENING, supra note 79, at 7. 
 81. See BOWKETT, supra note 60, at 19; HAYCOX, supra note 65, at 271; NASKE 
& SLOTNICK, supra note 45, at 162.  These regionalist views are apparent in the 
admission debates.  During the three-day debate in the 81st Congress, Senators 
from Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Oregon, Vermont, and 
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To ensure political integration, Congress had previously re-
quired several provisions in new state constitutions,82 such as the 
“Blaine Amendments,” which prevent states from using public 
funds to support sectarian schools.83  By consistently requiring spe-
cific provisions, Congress often compelled new states to conform to 
a consensus on constitutional text,84 creating “an extraordinary de-
gree of mimesis by state constitution makers.”85  This forced homo-
geneity suggests that western states whose cultural heritage was at 
odds with established eastern practices were prevented from fully 
expressing that heritage in the new state constitution.86 
Alaska was little different.87  Although Alaska was finally ad-
mitted by an admission act, several enabling acts had been pro-
posed in previous years.  These bills contained similar require-
 
Wyoming spoke in favor of statehood; Senators from Arkansas, Georgia, Missis-
sippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Tennessee spoke in opposition to statehood.  
GRUENING, supra note 79, at 55–56. 
 82. Hall, supra note 22, at 392; Biber, supra note 32, at 132.  This power is 
purportedly derived from the Guarantee Clause.  See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.  See 
also H.R. REP. No. 2079, at 4–5 (1909) (on statehood for Arizona and New Mex-
ico) (“[T]he Constitution nowhere defines the qualification of Territories for 
statehood.  Congress therefore has discretion as to what conditions shall be re-
quired of Territories seeking admission as States.”).  In fact, the constitutionality 
of these additional requirements hinges on congressional power to legislate in the 
area without recourse to the Guarantee Clause.  See also Biber, supra note 32, at 
175 (citing Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)). 
 83. Luke Lantta, Note, The Post-Zelman Voucher Battleground: Where to 
Turn After Federal Challenges To Blaine Amendments Fail, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. (forthcoming).  For entry of many western states, Congress required 
strong anti-polygamy provisions and the teaching of English in public schools.  
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 2079, at 2 (1909) (relating to statehood for Arizona and 
New Mexico). 
 84. Biber, supra note 32, at 132; Hall, supra note 22, at 392. 
 85. See Hall, supra note 22, at 392. 
 86. Biber, supra note 32, at 132–73 (discussing assimilative congressional re-
quirements for Hawaii, Louisiana, New Mexico, and Utah). 
 87. Contra Biber, supra note 32, at 129, 207.  I disagree with Biber on this 
point chiefly because he fails to consider the path dependence of requirements of 
constitutional provisions.  Alaska entered the Union without passage of an ena-
bling act, and hence its constitution was framed with an eye to presumed congres-
sional requirements, not actual requirements.  There was thus no reason to re-
quire constitutional provisions in an admission act when those provisions are 
already in the proposed state constitution.  Biber’s contention that Congress had 
few requirements of Alaska and Hawaii is merely an artifact of the prudent judg-
ments of delegates to Alaska and Hawaii’s constitutional conventions. 
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ments to the enabling acts passed for other western states.88  For 
example, a 1955 House bill would have required Alaska to adopt 
constitutional provisions prohibiting publicly funded sectarian 
schools.89  The delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Convention 
knew they would likely have to capitulate preemptively to similar 
demands.90  In the Alaska Constitution, several sections are respon-
sive to particular requirements outlined by the House of Represen-
tatives in proposed bills addressing Alaska statehood.91 
3. Showing Capacity for Self-Government.  To win over Con-
gress, Alaska also needed to demonstrate a capacity for self-
government.92  “Knowing that a nationwide audience would judge 
their performance, the delegates’ goal was to produce a document 
that would be viewed inside and outside Alaska as prudent and re-
sponsible.”93  In some ways, the holding of the constitutional con-
vention was itself a carefully considered maneuver to show the will-
ingness and ability to self-govern.94  But this maneuver required a 
modern, model constitution, not one purely responsive to the con-
stitutional preferences of Alaskans.  To frame the ideal constitu-
tion believed to be necessary for statehood, the delegates copied 
recent state constitutions and incorporated advice from academic 
and governmental organizations with an eye to demonstrating po-
litical maturity. 
For both Alaska and Hawaii, the National Municipal League’s 
Model State Constitution was a primary influence.95  The Model 
 
 88. Compare Biber, supra note 32, at 130–31 and Lantta, supra note 83, at 218 
with H.R. REP. No. 84–88, at 47 (1955). 
 89. H.R. REP. No. 84–88, at 47. 
 90. Instead of an enabling act, which authorizes the state to hold a constitu-
tional convention to prepare for statehood, and a subsequent admission act to 
formally accept the state, states that use the Tennessee Plan only require an ad-
mission act to be accepted into the Union. 
 91. Compare ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 1 and art. IX § 2 with H.R. REP. No. 
84–88, at 47. 
 92. MCBEATH, supra note 10, at xix; MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 60, 
at 117. 
 93. MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 60, at 117 (emphasis added); see 
also generally GORDON S. HARRISON, ALASKA’S CONSTITUTION: A CITIZEN’S 
GUIDE (3d ed. 1992). 
 94. NASKE & SLOTNICK, supra note 45, at 209.  The maneuver worked—such 
initiative was noted by other states’ Senators.  See 103 CONG. REC. 466–69 (1957) 
(statement of Sen. Murray). 
 95. Specifically, the fifth edition, published in 1948, was the most influential 
for Alaska.  See COMMITTEE ON STATE GOVERNMENT OF THE NATIONAL 
MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION WITH EXPLANATORY 
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was a distillation of the best provisions in state constitutions, in-
formed by prominent thinkers and federal constitutional protec-
tions.  The Alaska Constitution’s judiciary article was also heavily 
influenced by ideas found in the New Jersey and Missouri Consti-
tutions.96  While it is all too clear that delegates to the Alaska Con-
stitutional Convention often adopted provisions from other consti-
tutions because they were either generally accepted ideas97 or 
reasonable reactions to territorial history, Congress’s demand that 
Alaskans exhibit the ability to govern themselves created an under-
lying motivation to adopt the consensus position. 
Occasionally, the delegates of the Alaska Constitutional Con-
vention specifically rejected the consensus position.  Knowing Con-
gress had in the past reviewed the entire proposed state constitu-
tion98 and assuming Congress would prefer certain uncontroversial 
constitutional provisions to others, delegates adopted these uncon-
troversial provisions rather than the academic consensus provi-
sions.  For example, the Model State Constitution of the era sug-
gested a unicameral legislature,99 but one reason the delegates 
chose a bicameral system was that they believed Congress would 
be leery of any boldness in the structure of the legislature.100 
Another example of the delegates rejecting the academic con-
sensus position concerned Article X, which appears to be one of 
the more uniquely Alaskan parts of the state constitution, since it 
discusses “boroughs”101 and not “counties,” as other modern state 
constitutions do.102  The committee that framed its provisions ex-
plicitly rejected the National Municipal League’s model provi-
sions,103 despite the fact that these provisions were the most up-to-
 
ARTICLES (Alaska Legislative Research Agency, 5th ed. 1948) [hereinafter 
MODEL STATE CONST.]. 
 96. Other states were also influential.  For instance, the free speech section of 
Alaska’s Constitution is taken directly from Idaho.  MCBEATH, supra note 10, at 
35. 
 97. See, e.g., MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 60, at 197 (discussing 
adoption of the Missouri Plan for judicial nominations and retention elections). 
 98. S. REP. No. 454, at 2–3 (1910) (discussing admission of Alabama, Louisi-
ana, and Texas). 
 99. MODEL STATE CONST. art. III, § 301. 
 100. MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 60, at 121 (“Concerned about how 
the nation as a whole and Congress in pt.icular would assess their political matur-
ity, the majority of delegates shied away from the boldness of a unicameral legisla-
ture.”);  see also BOWKETT, supra note 60, at 32. 
 101. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 2. 
 102. See, e.g., WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 23.  In fact, a “borough” was considered 
effectively a modernized “county.”  See FISCHER, supra note 43, at 118–19. 
 103. FISCHER, supra note 43, at 125. 
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date of any in the Model.104  The Alaska delegates were specifically 
concerned that a county system would be a poor choice given the 
requirements of the new state and purposefully chose to use “bor-
ough” instead of “county” to ensure that courts would consider lo-
cal government in light of Alaska’s constitutional structure and 
needs.105  The adopted provisions reflect the delegates’ desire to 
create a local government system that would work for Alaska’s 
unique geography. 
Yet, these provisions were also responsive to the opinions of 
national experts concerned with the form of local government, es-
pecially those of the Kestenbaum Commission, who reported to 
Congress and the President on the relationships among different 
governmental levels.  Less controversial today, in 1956 the relation-
ship between state and local government was of paramount impor-
tance because of the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education106 decision.  
Brown focused Congress on the interaction between local and state 
governments.107 To examine this interaction, Congress authorized 
the Kestenbaum Commission to study state-local intergovernmen-
tal relations.108  One of the Commission’s main findings was that 
state constitutions were too restrictive of local governmental pow-
ers.109  The Commission’s report was quoted at length at the Alaska 
Constitutional Convention110 and Article X broadly answers its 
concerns111 and flatly rejects the National Municipal League 
 
 104. MODEL STATE CONST. v, introductory cmt. 
 105. FISCHER, supra note 43, at 118–19. 
 106. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 107. See KESTENBAUM COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 5 (1955) (“In light of recent 
Supreme Court decisions, and in our present highly interdependent society, there 
are few activities of government indeed in where there is not some degree of na-
tional interest, and in which the National Government is without constitutional 
authority to pt.icipate in some manner. . . . In all of its actions the National Gov-
ernment should be concerned with their effects on State and local governments.”). 
 108. Id. at iii. 
 109. Id. at 37 (“[M]any State constitutions restrict the scope, effectiveness, and 
adaptability of State and local action.  These self-imposed constitutional limita-
tions make it difficult for many States to perform all of the services their citizens 
require, and consequently have frequently been the underlying cause of State and 
municipal pleas for Federal assistance.”). 
 110. ALASKA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: MINUTES 
OF THE DAILY PROCEEDINGS (1965), available at http://www.law.state. 
ak.us/doclibrary/cc_minutes.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005) [hereinafter 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MINUTES]. 
 111. Compare ALASKA. CONST. art. X, § 1 (stating “[t]he purpose of this article 
is to provide for maximum local self-government with a minimum of local gov-
ernment units”) with CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MINUTES, supra note 110 
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model.112  In keeping with the report’s recommendations, Article X 
also instructs judges to interpret the article liberally, with a mind 
toward granting expansive powers to local governments.113  It does 
so through a clause delegates passed in part to preserve sufficient 
flexibility in whatever local governmental system would be ulti-
mately authorized by the state legislature.114  While these historical 
facts are not enough to prove that the delegates of the Alaska Con-
stitutional Convention framed Article X to meet the perceived ex-
pected requirements of Congress for local governmental powers, 
they are consistent with that theory.115 
The key to achieving statehood was showing Congress that 
Alaskans could govern themselves.  Thus the delegates at the con-
stitutional convention undertook to adopt a model document, and 
where Congress’s needs seemed likely to depart from constitu-
tional models, the delegates abandoned the models to respond to 
those concerns.  By modeling the constitution on generally ac-
cepted ideas and anticipating federal requirements, the delegates 
responded to tremendous dual pressures from their constituents 
and the United States Congress.  In so doing, the delegates may 
have masked the Alaska constitutional heritage.  This masking 
hinders efforts to uncover the meaning of constitutional text from 
the historical record because the historical record is filled with in-
herent ambiguity. 
 
(noting how “‘[m]ore or less hidden in this picture is a paradox that consistently 
plagues the state, . . . too many local governments and not enough local govern-
ment.’  That is one of the points that we have tried to meet here, not to establish 
too many local governments but those that would be established would be effec-
tive.”) and KESTENBAUM COMM’N, supra note 107, at 48–49. 
 112. FISCHER, supra note 43, at 125.  The National Municipal League had just 
updated its provisions regarding local government (art. VIII) in the fifth edition.  
See MODEL STATE CONST. v, introductory cmt.  In the next edition, it incorporated 
the need for adaptable local government. 
 113. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 1.  This provision was included to nullify “Dil-
lon’s Rule,” which operates to narrowly construe local government powers.  See 
MCBEATH, supra note 10, at 182. 
 114. See FISCHER, supra note 43, at 127. 
 115. It is of course also possible that both the delegates and the Kestenbaum 
Commission reacted to the same recent governmental issues regarding local gov-
ernment in the same manner, or that consultants advised the delegates regarding 
these issues between editions of the model constitution.  Given that the Ke-
stenbaum Commission report was discussed at the convention, however, it at least 
must have been in their minds and its divergence from the Model State Constitu-
tion is apparent. 
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IV.  FROM AMBIGUITY TO LIBERTY 
A. Interpreting Ambiguous Origins 
In determining how courts should interpret legitimate but un-
original constitutional text, there are two main problems that need 
to be resolved.  First, as Professor Gardner argues, it seems impos-
sible to interpret state constitutions independently of the Federal 
Constitution because state constitutions do not seem to arise from 
distinct ways of life.116  State constitutions borrow heavily from each 
other, frustrating attempts to find a unique state constitutional 
heritage within the text of a particular state constitution.  More-
over, constitutional provisions are often era-dependent rather than 
state-dependent.117  For instance, “[i]f Illinois has an environmental 
clause in its constitution and Oregon does not, this does not say 
that the people of Illinois place environmental values higher than 
do Oregonians.  It says something about adopting a constitution in 
1972 as compared with 1859.”118 
Second, some scholars have challenged the precision of deter-
minant originalist interpretation given the paucity of historical data 
in so many state histories.119  The complementary criticism, rarely 
voiced, is that courts are under pressure to use historical justifica-
tions to achieve contemporary ideological ends, and so they occa-
sionally fill in the blanks of the historical record.120  If judges have 
difficulty discovering historical evidence of a political community’s 
values,121 they will understandably continue to interpret their state 
 
 116. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 761, 793–94, 818–19 (1992); see also Robert F. Utter, The Practice 
of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washington’s Experi-
ence, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (1992).  This is a remarkable argument espe-
cially given that uniform state constitutionalism was specifically rejected at the 
first Constitutional Congress.  Roderick L. Ireland, How We Do It in Massachu-
setts: An Overview of How the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Has Inter-
preted Its State Constitution to Address Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 405, 417–18 (2004). 
 117. See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 
18 GA. L. REV. 165, 195 (1984).  An example from the Alaska constitution would 
be the anti-McCarthy provision.  See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 118. Linde, supra note 117, at 195. 
 119. See Gardner, supra note 116, at 811; see also Utter, supra note 116, at 1156. 
 120. Teachout, supra note 20, at 34. 
 121. See RAKOVE, supra note 5, at 3–22; see also Martin S. Flaherty, History 
“Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 525 (1995) 
(listing examples of mistakes in interpreting constitutional history). 
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constitutions in light of federal constitutional doctrine, with its sur-
feit of historical information regarding apparently related values.122 
Professor Gardner is correct in noting the difficulties in pars-
ing-out distinct constitutional heritages among states.123  This is es-
pecially true in light of the intentionally assimilative effects of con-
gressional approval of state constitutions.124  Yet, Gardner fails to 
consider that state constitutional heritages are masked in systemic 
ways by pressures to conform to the will of Congress.125  Where the 
state’s distinct constitutional heritage is especially robust or meets 
only limited congressional resistance, these pressures to conform 
will fail to shape the state constitution.  Any modality of constitu-
tional interpretation will pick up this robust heritage.  But, where 
these pressures succeed in shaping the new state constitution, state 
courts should reasonably abandon determinant originalism in order 
to interpret state constitutions in light of the constitutional heri-
tage.  There simply is not enough historical or theoretical contin-
gency to make originalist accounts determinant of constitutional 
meaning. 
Because of the twin demands from constituents and Congress, 
delegates to Alaska’s constitutional convention frequently referred 
to other state constitutions, model constitutions, independent 
evaluators, and Congress’s likely demands.  Whole branches of 
government, such as the judiciary, were empowered with language 
borrowed from other constitutions.126  The delegates preemptively 
responded to Congress’s demands when framing specific provisions 
such as the finance and taxation article.127  Even when archaic con-
stitutional provisions had little bearing on the modern world, dele-
gates erred on the side of tradition in making the Alaska Constitu-
 
 122. See Schapiro, supra note 63, at 419–28. 
 123. Gardner, supra note 116, at 763–64. 
 124. See Biber, supra note 32, at 132. 
 125. I assume with Gardner that states are attempting to interpret their consti-
tutions as distinct constitutional enterprises and not merely as expressions of a 
shared, national constitutional enterprise.  According to Lawrence Friedman, 
Gardner’s critique of independent interpretation loses its force when this assump-
tion is attacked.  See Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue 
and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 93, 136 (2000); see also 
Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. 
L. REV. 1147, 1160 (1993) (“State constitutional texts are best thought of as multi-
ple efforts to articulate a common aspiration for constitutional governance.”). 
 126. FISCHER, supra note 43, at 113.  Again, compare ALASKA CONST. art. IV 
with MO. CONST. art. V.  The election of judges was hotly debated at the conven-
tion, but the Missouri Plan for retention elections eventually won out.  See 
MCBEATH, supra note 10, at 15. 
 127. See FISCHER, supra note 43, at 142. 
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tion like other constitutions.  This suggests that delegates were re-
sponsive to more than merely Alaskans’ constitutional preferences 
when framing the constitution’s text; instead, the Alaska Constitu-
tion is in large part derivative. 
It is tempting to conclude that the Alaska Constitution, so 
largely derived, must be interpreted in light of source state consti-
tutions and of the constitutional provisions that the National Mu-
nicipal League highlighted as models.  Such a conclusion would be 
wrong.  Alaska courts can discount constitutional analogies in light 
of an indeterminant originalist history that suggests ambiguity 
about many of Alaska’s constitutional provisions.  This inherent 
ambiguity in state constitutional history prevents courts from iden-
tifying the historical contingencies that could determine original 
meaning in state constitutions. 
Alaska has an easy answer to the major challenge of indeter-
minant originalist independent interpretation: the acquiescence of 
constitutional convention delegates belies a distinct constitutional 
heritage. Provisions like the Blaine Amendment were adopted de-
spite the Supreme Court’s holding that such requirements, if they 
had actually been enacted, would have been unconstitutional.128  It 
is unclear whether delegates to the Alaska Constitutional Conven-
tion actually knew that Congress could not constitutionally make 
requirements of state constitutions outside of its Article I and 
Guarantee Clause powers.129  Congress, for its part, required them 
because of the belief, regardless of constitutionality, that these pro-
visions would have some effect on the new state.130  If Alaska dele-
gates knew these requirements were unconstitutional, they acqui-
esced out of desire for statehood (as others had before them).131  
Even if Alaska’s offer of specific constitutional provisions could 
bind the state more than a congressional requirement could, the 
state would merely be bound to constitutional text, not constitu-
 
 128. See Biber, supra note 32, at 184. 
 129. The record suggests that the delegates did not know such requirements 
were unconstitutional; for instance, there is no mention in the constitutional con-
vention’s minutes of Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911), the leading case holding 
that many federal requirements for state constitutions are unconstitutional.  See 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION MINUTES, supra note 110; see also FISCHER, supra 
note 43, at 19.  However, given the academic attention devoted to the Alaska Con-
stitutional Convention, one would imagine that some delegates, or at least con-
sultants, were aware of this precedent. 
 130. Biber, supra note 32, at 184 (discussing motivations for similar, previous 
requirements of earlier state constitutions). 
 131. Id. at 195 (discussing the example of New Mexico). 
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tional law.132  The Alaska Constitution, like the Federal Constitu-
tion, does not come with its own cipher133—Alaska courts need not 
interpret constitutional provisions in light of Congress’s intent in 
making a requirement.  This acquiescence by delegates to pre-
sumed demands of Congress is not binding. 
Because the Alaska constitutional text was created under 
pressure to acquire statehood, Alaska courts should always read it 
with an eye to the state’s constitutional heritage,134 and not just par-
rot federal interpretations of federal analogues, in order to main-
tain the Alaska Constitution’s greater protection for civil, political, 
and social rights for Alaskans. 
B. A Few Opportunities for Expanded Rights 
In addition to being able to meet the theoretical challenge of 
indeterminant originalism, Alaska courts can create a more har-
monious and consistent constitutional doctrine by encouraging in-
dependent interpretation through indeterminant originalism.  For 
example, the Alaska Court of Appeals has outlined two methods of 
understanding state constitutional provisions that must be reap-
praised when embracing indeterminant originalism.  These meth 
 
 132. Judging from the historical record, Alaska realistically could not even be 
bound to a constitutional text to the degree of preventing amendments.  Congress 
has a long history of inserting specific “unamendable” provisions into state consti-
tutions, and no such provisions, even allowing for the possibility that such provi-
sions are constitutional, were adopted in the Alaska Constitution.  Biber, supra 
note 32, at 131.  Another way of thinking about this dialogue is that Congress had 
certain required concepts, but had no power to control the conceptions of those 
concepts that Alaska would adopt in the future.  Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134–36 (1977). 
 133. The fact that Alaska wanted statehood so badly that Congress did not 
even have to ask for these specific provisions suggests an alternative reason for the 
framing of some constitutional provisions.  If such provisions are, in fact, sops, 
why should a court use an originalist modality to interpret them according to the 
models of the Alaska Constitution?  The originalist modality actually counsels 
against interpreting these provisions in line with their federal constitutional ana-
logues. 
 134. See Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1970) (“We are 
free . . . to develop additional constitutional rights and privileges under our Alaska 
Constitution if we find such fundamental rights and privileges to be within the in-
tention and spirit of our local constitutional language and to be necessary for the 
kind of civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our constitutional 
heritage.”). 
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ods contradict each other and are both dangerous to civil rights.  
First, in State v. Gonzalez,135 the court used a “lockstep approach”136 
to determine that the Alaska constitutional provision governing 
self-incrimination means the same thing that the federal constitu-
tional analogue meant in 1956 when it was incorporated into the 
Alaska Constitution.137  While the Gonzalez court’s approach actu-
ally afforded the criminal defendant more protection than the 
United States Constitution currently would, such retrospective 
lock-stepping essentially ossifies state constitutional provisions138 
and could operate even where there are distinct textual differences 
between the Alaska and federal texts.139  This process of pegging 
Alaska constitutional protections to 1956 national minimums 
would, if applied to other civil rights, wreak havoc on values that 
have emerged and endured over the past fifty years. 
Although Gonzalez specifically disavowed tacking the mean-
ing of the Alaska Constitution to changes in federal constitutional 
doctrine,140 the court of appeals has also created a rebuttable pre-
sumption in favor of doing just that.  Under this “criteria ap-
proach” canon of constitutional construction, a litigant bears the 
burden of showing something in the “text, context, or history” of 
the Alaska Constitution that justifies an interpretation independent 
from that of the Federal Constitution.141 This presumption was ap-
 
 135. 825 P.2d 920 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). 
 136. Id. at 931 (“Departure from the original intent of the drafters of article I, § 
9 requires something more than a recent shift in federal constitutional interpreta-
tion.”).  For an explanation of the “lockstep approach” and its alternatives, the 
“criteria approach” and the “primacy approach,” see Robert F. Williams, In the 
Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in 
Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudications, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1015, 1021–26 (1997) (“Under this methodology, the state supreme court . . . sets 
forth a list of circumstances (criteria or factors) under which it says it will feel jus-
tified in interpreting its state constitution more broadly than the Federal Constitu-
tion.”). 
 137. See Gonzalez, 825 P.2d at 931. 
 138. Linde, supra note 117, at 195. 
 139. State v. Dankworth, 672 P.2d 148, 150–51 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (“We 
recognize that the state constitutional provision, while using different language, is 
essentially the same as its federal counterpart and was intended by the constitu-
tional convention to be so.”) (citing Alaska Constitutional Convention, Commit-
tee Proposal 5, Commentary on the Legislative Article, § 6, at 2 (Dec. 14, 1955)). 
 140. Gonzalez, 825 P.2d at 931. 
 141. E.g., Davis v. Municipality of Anchorage, 945 P.2d 307, 311 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1997).  Several state judges have outlined potential criteria to justify inde-
pendent interpretation.  See, e.g., Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: 
The Jurisprudence of Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 
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plied throughout the 1990s to criminal procedure questions, includ-
ing double jeopardy,142 the right to post-conviction bail,143 and the 
right to confront witnesses.144  This presumption, grounded as it is 
in established precedent, is in tension with the responsibility to in-
terpret independently the Alaska Constitution outlined by the 
Alaska Supreme Court in Baker.145 
The presumption that the Alaska Constitution should be in-
terpreted in the same way as the Federal Constitution absent some 
textual, contextual, or historical reason should be rejected for sev-
eral reasons.146  First, it prevents Alaska courts from looking to 
Alaska’s local constitutional heritage when deciding important is-
sues of criminal procedure.  Moreover, nullifying this presumption 
would generally expand criminal procedural rights and bring an 
isolated branch of constitutional jurisprudence in line with the gen-
eral theory of independent interpretation established by the Alaska 
Supreme Court.147  It would make Alaska serve as a policy labora-
 
635, 644–45 (1994) (discussing Washington and Connecticut’s six-factor criteria 
approach); see also Ireland, supra note 116, at 404; Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for 
Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. L. 
REV. 793, 795 (2000) (describing Oregon’s originalist “template” primacy ap-
proach, among other approaches taken by Oregon courts). 
 142. See Davis, 945 P.2d at 311; Aaron v. City of Ketchikan, 927 P.2d 335, 336 
(Alaska Ct. App. 1996); State v. Zerkel, 900 P.2d 744, 758 n.8 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1995); Mitchell v. State, 818 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991). 
 143. Hosier v. State, 976 P.2d 869, 870–71 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999). 
 144. See Pease v. State, 54 P.3d 316, 329 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 145. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401–02 (Alaska 1970). 
 146. In addition to the rights-based issues discussed above, Robert Williams has 
identified six, more general problems with prospective lockstepping:  (1) it pre-
judges future cases; (2) it precludes state courts from easily independently inter-
preting the state constitution; (3) it snuffs out independent analysis by lawyers, 
judges, and scholars; (4) it reduces the usefulness of state constitutional law; (5) it 
relegates state constitutions to legal shadows; and (6) it prevents states from learn-
ing from each other.  See Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Con-
stitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1520–27 (2005).  In comparison to a lockstep ap-
proach (a conclusive presumption of dependent interpretation), these same prob-
lems exist under a criteria approach albeit to a lesser degree—as the possible cri-
teria for independent interpretation increase, these dangers decrease. 
 147. See Baker, 471 P.2d at 386.  Nullifying the presumption might also honor 
Alaska’s constitutional heritage by bringing the procedural rights of criminal de-
fendants in line with  the rights of those states, such as Oregon, whose law heavily 
influenced Alaska’s past.  See Organic Act of 1884, ch. 53, § 7, 23 Stat. 25–26 
(1884) (cited in Brown, supra note 27, at 90).  At present, Oregon’s due process 
jurisprudence protects criminal defendants far more than Alaska’s does.  David C. 
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tory for other states and the federal government to observe as they 
continue to balance the interests of society and the rights of crimi-
nal defendants.148  While it is true that establishing two different 
constitutional standards could be confusing to law enforcement,149 
having prior independent interpretations of relevant provisions 
would prevent future erosions in federal protections from impact-
ing the rights of Alaskans.150 
The main alternative to the “criteria approach” and the “lock-
step approach” is the “primacy approach.”151  This approach, im-
plicit in Baker, would better honor the distinct constitutional heri-
tage of Alaska while building a reservoir of constitutional holdings 
on which sister states and federal courts could draw.152  It is espe-
cially important to adopt a primacy approach for state textual pro-
visions that are identical or very similar to federal constitutional 
provisions; it is only when two courts interpret the same words in 
 
Brody, Criminal Procedure Under State Law: An Empirical Examination of Selec-
tive New Federalism, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 75 (2002). 
 148. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The 
Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (1985) (favor-
ing the use of state courts as laboratories for testing constitutional interpreta-
tions).  These policy experiments are critical to our nation’s moral progress and 
constitutional dialogue.  See generally Friedman, supra note 125; Lawrence G. 
Sager, Cool Federalism and the Life-Cycle of Moral Progress, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1385 (2005). 
 149. Barry Latzer, The New Judicial Federalism and Criminal Justice, 22 
RUTGERS L.J. 863, 864–65 (1991).  Of course, the court need not adopt two stan-
dards through independent interpretation, for it can always reflect and still inter-
pret the state provisions to match the federal provisions.  Id.; see also Earl M. 
Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 98, 99 (1988). 
 150. Cf. Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions—The Montana 
Disaster, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1095, 1138 (1985) (citing the Montana Supreme Court: 
“Federal rights are considered minimal and a state constitution may be more de-
manding than the equivalent federal constitutional provision.”); Bruce Ledewitz, 
When Federal Law Is Also State Law, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 561, 571 (1999) (arguing 
that federal law sets the rights’ floor, but states may raise the level in or under 
their own constitutions).  If state constitutions are interpreted in prospective lock-
step with the Federal Constitution, federal interpretations may cause turnarounds 
in state constitutional law, effectively making the U.S. Supreme Court the last 
word on state law issues.  See Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitu-
tional Doctrine, supra note 146, at 1512–13. 
 151. See Williams, Continuing Methodology and Legitimacy Problems in Inde-
pendent State Constitutional Rights Adjudications, supra note 136, at 1015–34. 
 152. James N.G. Cauthen, Horizontal Federalism in the New Judicial Federal-
ism: A Preliminary Look at Citations, 66 ALB. L. REV. 783, 793 (2003). 
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two different sources that a true dialogue occurs.153  There is no 
reason to assume that two apparently analogous provisions must 
mean the same thing, or even if they do, that the federal interpreta-
tion is correct.154 
These observations about the history of the Alaska Constitu-
tion can bolster the state’s already strong line of cases based on in-
dependent interpretation under Baker155 and are critically impor-
tant under the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Henry v. 
Mississippi156 and Michigan v. Long.157  Under these rulings, the less 
federal law forms the basis for state court decisions, the lower the 
likelihood of United States Supreme Court review.158  In the past, 
the Alaska Supreme Court has grounded its independent interpre-
tation not so much on the history of the constitutional provisions 
themselves as on Alaska’s unique constitutional heritage.  Accord-
ing to the court of appeals: 
Constitutional interpretation follows the “rule that the intent 
underlying . . . constitutional language should first be gathered 
from the plain meaning of the language itself.” . . . [T]his inquiry 
is not controlled by any one source of authority, such as United 
States Supreme Court precedent or an appeal to the intent of the 
framers of the Alaska Constitution.  Rather, such authority is 
considered and, when appropriate, followed when helpful in dis-
cerning the “intention and spirit of our local constitutional lan-
guage and [whether the right invoked is] necessary for the kind 
of civilized life and ordered liberty which is at the core of our 
constitutional heritage.”159 
With the creation of an easily accessible, comprehensive historical 
source for the constitutional convention, the Alaska Supreme 
Court can expect to see many more historical arguments regarding 
constitutional provisions.  While this eases the burden on lawyers 
uncovering supportive documentation, it increases the burden on 
 
 153. See Friedman, supra note 125, at 99, 133; see also Kahn, supra note 125, at 
1163 (“The common enterprise of interpretation is held together by a common 
discourse, not by a single telos.”). 
 154. Tarr, supra note 28, at 848. 
 155. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). 
 156. 379 U.S. 443, 446 (1965) (“[T]his Court will decline to review state court 
judgments which rest on independent and adequate state grounds, even where 
those judgments also decide federal questions.”). 
 157. 436 U.S. 1032, 1042–44 (1983) (holding that the Court may review state 
court decisions allegedly based on independent state grounds if the decision itself 
rests primarily on federal law). 
 158. See Van Flein, supra note 17, at 245. 
 159. State v. Gonzalez, 853 P.2d 526, 529 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993) (citing Baker, 
471 P.2d at 397, 402) (emphasis omitted). 
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courts to wade through “‘law-office’ history.”160  Courts must obvi-
ously delve into the historical particulars of the provisions at hand, 
but it is important to note that these provisions were forged under 
tremendous general pressures from both the Alaska citizenry and  
the U.S. Congress. 
These pressures indicate that the Alaska constitutional heri-
tage is truly robust where the Alaska constitution differs from 
“model” constitutions that delegates examined; it also shows that 
parts of the Alaska constitutional heritage may have been masked 
by the overall effort to obtain statehood.  After all, “Alaskans 
wrote their constitution primarily to use as a tool in their quest for 
statehood.  Wanting to make a good impression on Congress and 
the nation, the founders strove to produce a model document re-
flecting the reformists’ standards of the time.”161  A historical ex-
amination of the Alaska Constitution thus suggests that its text and 
structure may not always be the only indicator of Alaska’s unique 
constitutional heritage.  It is not simply Alaska’s constitutional 
heritage that is infused into Alaska’s Constitution, but the re-
quirements of the conforming power of Congress and academic 
consensus.  Any presumption in favor of interpreting the Alaska 
Constitution in line with the Federal Constitution should thus be 
discarded. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In his speech to the Alaska Constitutional Convention, Robert 
B. Atwood argued that the Alaska Constitution must pass three 
tests: 
First, the test of the people who sent you here who must approve 
it by vote and ratification.  Second, the approval of Congress 
who must accept it as a sound document upon which to build a 
state government and third, that everlasting test that comes 
when the document is placed into operation as the highest law of 
the land.162 
Alaska has a unique constitutional heritage that serves as the 
basis for independent interpretation of its state constitution.  Un-
derstanding how the delegates forged a document to pass Atwood’s 
first two tests can help show judges how to interpret the Alaska 
 
 160. Alfred H. Kelley, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. 
REV. 119, 122 (1965). 
 161. MCBEATH & MOREHOUSE, supra note 60, at 133. 
 162. Robert B. Atwood, Chairman, Alaska Statehood Comm’n, Address at the 
Alaska Constitutional Convention (Nov. 8, 1955), http://www.alaska.edu/ 
creatingalaska/convention/speeches/atwood.xml. 
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Constitution to pass Atwood’s third and ultimately most important 
test. 
Professor Gardner argues that since state constitutions do not 
reflect distinctive ways of life, and judges still demand that lawyers 
marshal historical arguments about the origins of state constitu-
tional provisions, each state should “convince the people of the 
states that they really do constitute unique communities that differ 
in fundamental ways from the communities defined by neighboring 
states and by the nation.”163  Alaskans, of course, need no convinc-
ing.  Alaskans today, like the Alaskans of 1956, identify in mean-
ingful ways with their home state.  Although the desire for state-
hood forced Alaska’s constitutional convention delegates to 
negotiate a model and modeled constitution, masking values in 
Alaska’s constitutional heritage, the ambiguity of the origins of 
Alaska’s constitutional text gives Alaska courts the opportunity to 
express those fundamental values.  By recognizing the indetermi-
nant origins of Alaska constitutional provisions, Alaska courts can 
better establish a distinct constitutional discourse benefiting Alas-
kans and contributing to the nation’s shared constitutional pro-
gress. 
 
 163. Gardner, supra note 116, at 832. 
